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th he e c ce en nt tr ra al li it ty y o of f h hu um ma an n v va al lu ue es s i in n t th he e L Li is sb bo on n t tr re ea at ty y p pr ro om mi is se e m mo or re e t th ha an n i it t c ca an n a ac ct tu ua al ll ly y o of ff fe er r? ? B Bi io om me et tr ri ic cs s l la aw w a an nd d p po ol li ic cy y a as s a a c ca as se e s st tu ud dy y M Ma ar ri ia a E Ed du ua ar rd da a G Go on nç ça al lv ve es s which established the European Economic Community (EEC) (1957) . In fact, the goal of the EEC was primarily economic, i.e., the establishment of 'a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States' (Article 2) as well as common policies in the fields of agriculture, transport and external trade (Article 3). In that context, there was more emphasis on basic economic freedoms than on fundamental values or principles.
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There is no doubt that the Charter offers a prime setting for the expression of the most prized European values in the form of both fundamental individual and collective rights and fundamental principles. Accordingly, the Charter has been regarded as an effort to make human rights determine rather than simply limit a EU system predominantly designed to guarantee market freedoms by requiring the legislator and the judiciary to practise tilting the balance between regulatory policies and individual freedoms in favour of the latter. 3 It has also been argued that a process mirroring the construction of the internal market may be in the making for fundamental human rights as well: with In this connection one might claim that the relevant issue facing the values and rights fabric is not just the impact of their constitutionalization, but also institutions, procedures and substantive principles that an advanced democratic system ought to ensure. Indeed, the design of the decisionmaking system, including the extent to which it provides for public consultation or public participation, may facilitate or otherwise constrain the receptiveness of the legal and regulatory system to particular values as well as shape how these are interpreted. As Foucault observed, in decision-making contexts power ultimately depends on the way the authority to decide on the relevant questions and the procedures for controlling and circumscribing the role of the various social actors are legally and institutionally regulated.
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A domain falling under EU's jurisdiction, and in which respect for the Treaty and the Charter's values is particularly critical in this day and age, is technological innovation and its effects on European society. Technological advance has been perceived as a prerequisite for improving social and economic progress since modern times. The accelerated pace of development and the employment of new technologies, in particular, biotechnologies, including genetic modification and cloning, information technologies or security technologies have created a rather uncertain picture whereby benefits tend to be more and more balanced against potential harmful impacts or risks.
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Likewise the interference of new technology with moral and ethical values regarded as fundamental by European societies for example human dignity and integrity, privacy or liberty, have become 4 P. Alston, J. Weiler, 'An "ever closer union" in need of a human rights policy', in P. Alston (ed) , The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999), 1, 8. In the EU context, human rights are most often referred to as 'fundamental rights.' No major conceptual difference is involved and the terms will be used interchangeably in this article. The distinction between fundamental (human) rights (not listed in the Treaties) and fundamental (economic) freedoms (listed in the Treaties) is relevant, however. Some consider economic freedoms to be human rights, but that is not the generally accepted view, cf von Bogdandy, 'The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? ... ' , 1326 . Against this backdrop, the present paper aims to appraise in what manner the legal and political discourse focused on human values can possibly shape the EU regulatory framework in a specific field, ie biometrics. Biometrics is a security technology whose development is being actively supported by the EU and is employed mainly for individual and collective surveillance. Biometrics elicited public controversy and anxiety across Europe that we take as an indicator of its problematic nature and of the dilemma that it raises over values such as human dignity, individual autonomy, liberty and privacy. The paper will begin by clarifying the key relevant concepts, namely values, principles and rights and how they relate to each other. Legal principles and human rights will provide the main points of entry for our review of European values in EU law and regulation on biometrics. The EU approach to biometrics will then be compared with the EU's handling of another delicate issue, human cloning, a biotechnology presently at the exploratory stage. The ways in which the EU legislator is addressing the pertinent value dilemmas will be discussed in the light of the political and social context. One key interrogation will be whether notwithstanding its legitimating aim, the novel discourse is perhaps working at the end of the day as a substitute for democratizing the EU decisionmaking system. 
VALUES, PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS
Broadly speaking, the law is essentially shaped by values: on a more general and abstract level, by the law's intrinsic values of justice, equality or security and, on a more practical level, by those values that are codified by the choices of the legislator in each domain of policy or regulation. The former tend toward universalization whereas the latter are evolving and changing, as they are framed by a society undergoing permanent processes of adjustment today. 7 In reality, the institutions and procedures that constitute our political systems typically shape the process of translating ethically based values into the law.
Values understood as ends or ideals to be pursued, or as standards of morality or justice, enter the law through principles and rights. The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights offers a paradigmatic example of a human rights protection system that combines principles and rights, including freedoms.
It has been suggested that values may be approached in two consecutive phases: firstly, philosophical reflection on morals or ethics and; secondly, the definition of norms referring to those values and leading to rules of conduct, including legal rules. 8 Principles and norms and their relation to values have been immersed in 'confusion and controversy', stated Alexy. 9 While Dworkin saw principles as standards to be observed because they constitute requirements of 'justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality' 10 , Alexy defined principles as 'norms commanding that something must be realized to the highest degree that is actually and legally possible.' 11 For
Habermas principles 'have a deontological sense', while values that are embraced by the law are teleological. 12 In the end, the most obvious distinctive feature of a legal principle may possibly lie in its juridical, rather than merely ethical or social quality, which is why it must be included in a formally legal norm.
Values lead to principles, which may assert rights and then from rights into rules and regulatory instruments in a 'series of interlocking definitions and distinctions'. 13 Such a 'legal cascade' flows from moral or ethical principles to ordinary law and case law. Attention should be drawn to the fact that there is no longer a rigid legal hierarchy. Different layers of principles and norms interrelate and influence one another. General principles of law, particularly those accepted by exemple, Article 37 affirms the principle that "A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development." Article 6 proclaims the right of "everyone" to "liberty and security of person". Biometrics relies on human characteristics to verify the identity of an individual. Face features, fingerprints, hand impressions, iris recognition or DNA are the kind of physiological features that can be used in biometrics. Biometrics can thus be defined as the identification of individuals using their biological or behavioural characteristics. 22 When collecting biometrical data, the physical integrity of the subject should be secured against any harm, it has been argued. As well governments. This will not make for a better world', an EC-sponsored report considered. 30 In this respect, the ultimate risk for democracy of a pervasive culture of fear and the behavioural constraints that it may further through the gradual, often subtle, multiplication of security devises should not be ignored.
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In view of these warnings, it is remarkable that the official European position on this complex matter has been based on the assumption that security and civil liberties can easily be conciliated. 32 The argument has been built around the idea that biometrics can even be used to guarantee privacy (when used to restrict access to a room or a computer through a fingerprint recognition technique used by an individual person for instance) countering the idea of 'more security, less privacy'. There were proposals to separate the two concepts, and proposals to delete the reference to security, which were not successful mainly because they formed part of the phrasing of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms adopted in 1950, following a tradition of many other human rights documents.
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The 'marriage' of security and freedom can, however, be said to have changed its meaning in current times. In fact, the right to security, which was essentially understood in the past to be an allencompassing guarantee of rights, in other words, a personal security against absence of safeguards resulting on a subversion of the rule of law, is now increasingly identified with a right to protection against external threats, i.e. a physical security protection.
39 Therefore, whereas in the past security came in support of freedom, it now justifies restrictions to liberties. This threat is being recognized together with the need to give precise meaning to the novel human right to security in order to counter the tendency to rendering security the 'legitimating principle upon which all fundamental rights are grounded.'
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This evolving sense of security as a right has definitely been related to the current international security policies. One might also infer from this that the latest EU option to bridge security and liberty forms part of a political strategy to render a novel EU security policy more acceptable to public opinion. This reading may help to explain the ways that the EU governing bodies are balancing the values at stake in respect of biometrics.
38 Charter 4332/00, Convention 35, 160, 161, 167. It should be recalled that the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights was influenced by the historical and social background of World War II. The context of the Charter was assumedly different and in other domains it departs from the Convention, namely by including new rights and freedoms, showing that the option to maintain the same phrasing regarding the 'right to liberty and security' was neither neutral nor necessarily 'natural'. rather than a value or rights-oriented one. The Regulation focuses on the technical specifications and standards for passports and travel documents, which it seeks to harmonize across the EU. 48 In a rather technocratic tone, the emphasis is put on biometrics as a requirement for the more secure and reliable identification of holders and on protection against falsification or other fraudulent use.
From the fundamental human rights point of view, the European legislator has limited its concern to biometrical data protection, thus discounting the implications of the employment of biometrics for individual privacy, including the intimacy component of privacy, as well as for freedom and democracy more generally. In truth, as pointed out, with biometrics, it is the human body that is being modelled and digitalized, and turned into an instrument under control, something that the EU initiatives have disregarded entirely.
Moreover, by providing incentives for the development of security technologies through its R&D framework programme, the EU is stimulating the expansion of an industry, and therefore a 'market' of surveillance, which may naturally share an interest in securitarian policies. The potential detrimental consequences for democracy of an expansive use of biometrics and other surveillance technologies are also played down in EU political discourse as they are rather portrayed as a means of protecting our democratic systems against external threats. Furthermore, conceiving of security and freedom as merged into one single right helps to reduce the scope for conflict about these rights, therefore to elude grounds for dispute in that connection.
However, biometrics is, we maintain, at the centre of a genuine conflict where liberty, in the sense of both the free movement of persons and individual autonomy and self-determination, is set against security as it is now understood, and involving not only strengthened border controls, but also the more general control of individual behaviour. 
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In sum, the effects of biometrics per se as a technology involving a particularly delicate sort of personal invasiveness and the perils that it carries for the workings of democracy have not been truly questioned or debated at EU level. EU regulatory action focused on the technical standardisation of biometrical passports and travel documents, whose utility was somehow taken for granted in the political circumstances of the time. From the substantive legal standpoint, attention was drawn away towards biometrical data protection, a rather more confined and firm legal terrain.
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REDUCING BIOMETRICS RELATED VALUES AND RIGHTS TO BIOMETRICAL DATA PROTECTION
The biometrical process actually involves capturing and collecting information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 'who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity', according to the EU data protection directive (Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2, a). As already noted, personal data protection represents an important dimension of biometrics regulation, but one that does not fill the gap referred to above. the right to know who the data controller is, the purpose of the processing and the recipient of the data, and to have inaccurate data rectified (Articles 10 and 11). However, data protection legislation has shortcomings in terms of the interests of individuals, given that it allows the data processor to be the first arbiter of the need to process the data.
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The Directive contains strengthened protections for the use of special categories of personal data, particularly data relating to racial or ethnic origin, religious or philosophical beliefs, and health 49 The importance of personal data protection and the widening of its scope have been acknowledged in the 'Human Rights Report' of 2010, published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, established in 2007. This report, the first since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, acknowledges the relevance of the rights to the protection of personal data and to privacy, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EUAFR), Annual Report, 2010, 3, http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/AR_2010-confedition_en.pdf. This is also revealed by the 2010 budget of the FRA, which includes in the 'freedoms' operational budget a category for the information society and, particularly respect for private life and protection of personal data, and another for visa and border control, in addition to the category for asylum and immigration. Cf EUAFR, 'Statement of revenue and expenditure of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2010', 36 and 48, http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA_2010_revenue-and-expenditure_en.pdf. 50 Existing data protection rules on the use of biometrics 'lack normative content and ethical debate', IPTS, 'Biometrics at the Frontiers …' 16. an additional category of personal data deserving special protection. Acknowledging the growing collection of biometrics, the Article 29 Working Party considered that biometrical data should only be used in a subsidiary way, or rather, whenever 'less intrusive material' does not allow the same effect. 51 The Working Party added that when choosing biometrics 'an evaluation of the respect for proportionality and the respect for legitimacy is necessary, taking into account the risks for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and notably whether or not the intended purpose could be achieved in a less intrusive way.' 52 The French Data Protection Authority, the 'Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés' (CNIL), followed this line of reasoning by observing the importance of proportionality when dealing with biometrics. 53 The balancing approach has been questioned, however, as it reduces rights to comparisons of relative weight, thus overlooking their fundamental moral status.
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The recognition by recent official EC reports of the lack of appropriate personal data protection in the former third pillar of the EU (ie, the area of freedom, security and justice) further reinforces the ensuing threat from the point of view of liberty and privacy. Indeed, the main limitation currently faced by the EU to provide for effective and comprehensive data protection arises from the constitutional architecture of the former EU pillars. While data protection is highly developed in the former first pillar (the internal market) of the EU, the data protection regime in the former third pillar cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Yet the former third pillar of the EU comprises areas such as police cooperation, the fight against terrorism, and matters of criminal law where the need for data protection is especially important.
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In fact, restrictions to privacy and personal data protection are accepted according to the Data 
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UNDERMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF BIOMETRICS FOR HUMAN VALUES
One may legitimately deduce from the above that, all in all, the European urge for the development and use of biometrics overestimates the values of security and of the internal market (to the extent that it promotes a surveillance industry) without due regard to their impact on individual freedoms and democracy. Actually, biometrics as a security or surveillance technology has not been officially questioned for its potential risk to human rights or other fundamental EU values even at a time when a Charter of Fundamental Rights has been formally adopted. Concerns expressed by a number of observers, including in reports drawn up for the European Commission on the potential interference of biometrics with human rights (freedom, privacy and intimacy and ultimately human dignity), and more generally with the workings of democratic society, have been somewhat overlooked. Quite the contrary, biometrics has been regarded a legitimate and even desirable technological innovation as is apparent from the EU's active promotion of security technologies.
The introduction of biometrics in passports and travel documents in the EU was, as said before, a consequence of a political decision made under pressure from the USA. Once that political decision had been made, the EU pursued its conventional and somewhat instrumental path towards the harmonisation of technical standards. Human rights considerations were formatted chiefly as a personal data protection issue resembling other data digital applications to be addressed under the existing general data protection regime, thus neglecting the special sensitivity of biometrical data in terms of privacy and intimacy, and ultimately human dignity. The prospects opened up by the Treaty of Lisbon's novel emphasis on values, and by the Charter, for the renewed and greater responsibility of EU institutions to 'promote the application' of fundamental human rights in the light of scientific and technological developments have been fairly discouraged, at least for now. The reading of this conclusion should bear in mind the conceptual ambiguity and the evolution of the significance of the values, principles and rights proclaimed by the Treaty and the Charter, as well as the contexts in which they are interpreted and applied. In fact, in the face of the newly perceived threats from terrorism and criminality, the upgrading of security to the status of a human right which is equal to the right to liberty represents a change from the traditional understanding of public security as a general interest which is likely to work against the rights of the individual and, therefore, to be interpreted in a restrictive manner.
We believe that the ensuing conceptual variation provides a powerful illustration of the different ways that the meaning of principles and rights laid down in the Treaty and the Charter can be construed and balanced in the light of specific European policies and strategies. In view of their general nature, their real sense is only defined or redefined thoroughly through implementation in certain fields and points in time. In reality, the EU legal framework for biometrics is being shaped by 
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COMPARING BIOMETRICS AND HUMAN CLONING LAW AND REGULATION
Comparison of the EU approach to biometrics and to other novel technologies with ethical implications may help to shed additional light on the EU's practical dealings with the fundamental values affirmed by the Treaty and the Charter. In this section, we attempt to compare the approaches to biometrics and cloning, particularly human cloning.
At the outset, it may be recalled that in contrast with biometrics, accepted as a legitimate technological innovation, human cloning for reproductive purposes is explicitly banned by the http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/opinion9_en.pdf. 68 GAEIB, Ethical Aspects of Cloning Techniques, 4. The first method is the simplest way to create a clone. This is a technique already employed for stock breeding that together with somatic cell nuclear transfer are the main techniques of reproductive cloning, or put simply, the use of technology to create a living copy of an existing human being. The second method, cloning by nuclear replacement, or therapeutic cloning, is a technology whereby embryonic stem cells can be harvested for curing diseases and eventually to replace organs and tissues. 69 GAEIB, Ethical Aspects of Cloning Techniques, 5. 70 GAEIB, Ethical Aspects of Cloning Techniques, 6. In the same vein, Dir 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions prohibits the granting of patents on processes for cloning human beings and uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purpose (paragraphs 41 and 42) as contrary to the purposes of public order and morality (Art 5, No 1 and 6). However, such exclusion did not affect 'inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it' (paragraph 42 and Art 6, No 2). that 'the human body is the vehicle for human dignity', provided some clarification of the concept of human dignity, with relevance for addressing the value implications of both human cloning and biometrics. 90 Actually, as noted above, biometrics also impinges on the human body, given that it involves the collection and digitalisation of images of intimate parts of the human body.
Nevertheless, the principle of human dignity has not been addressed in EU law and regulation in relation to biometrics.
Thus human cloning, as a technology that interferes with human integrity and even human identity or uniqueness, appears to motivate a greater protection of human rights at EU level than biometrics, a surveillance technology, which, though affecting people's freedom and individuality, has been officially portrayed as a condition rather than a danger for liberty. It can be deduced that the ethical implications of human body manipulation, particularly when human life is at stake, raise higher levels of collective emotion and concern than matters relating to individual freedom and democracy.
It is, however, hard to establish any kind of hierarchy of these fundamental values in theory and besides, no effective inquiry or debate has been held in the public domain on the perception of these values or rights by society. In the end, the banning of human cloning was confined explicitly to its reproductive applications, despite the apprehension of the European Parliament, based on the prevailing interests of EU R&D policy combined with a rather narrow understanding of both the ethical problems raised by therapeutic uses of cloning and the scope of the principles of human integrity and dignity. 
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CONCLUSION
Is it reasonable to conclude that the new centrality of human values and fundamental human rights in the Treaty and the Charter promises more than it can actually offer?
The various assessments of the value implications of biometrics and human cloning in academic and non-academic appraisals and the divergent, sometimes conflicting, positions of different EU institutions and advisory bodies indicate that political and policy options offer better measures for giving practical substance to the principles and rights detailed in the Treaty or in the Charter than any ethically-based or abstract juridical interpretation of those principles or rights. In reality, the ways in which the relevant principles and rights are being defined and balanced owes appreciably to the ways that the EU is pursuing its political and policy goals. The meanings assigned to the principles and rights guaranteed by the Treaty and the Charter and their translation into European regulation were to be embedded in political debate and battles between sometimes contradictory arguments within the EU system itself. In these struggles, economic and security considerations have normally prevailed over ethically or morally based legal claims, such as those based on the right to freedom or on democracy. In the regulation of biometrics, the focus on data protection (a matter already framed under established European law, i.e. Directive 95/46/EC) in detriment to the values and rights of privacy and intimacy was evidence of the EU strategy to confine sensitive issues to more easily manageable legal frameworks.
In the case of human cloning, the way chosen by the drafters of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to overcome the controversy on whether to ban human cloning absolutely or only for reproduction, by leaving it somewhat ambiguous, appears to have been designed to respond to the public outcry about the cloning of human beings, while not raising insurmountable obstacles to stem research and potential therapeutic applications of cloning.
All in all, the internal EU debates on the legal frameworks for biometrics and human cloning do not seem to have shed enough light on the practical effects of the Charter's approach to particular values as principles or as rights. Indeed, in addressing the issue of human values, the normative implications of a principle, including the responsibilities they involve for the EU and for the Member States (for example, the principle that human dignity is inviolable), may converge with the entitlements assigned to individuals as rights. Particularly in highly technical and organised domains such as those addressed in this paper (security technologies, biotechnologies), human rights can hardly be mobilised by individual citizens as calls for positive action by public institutions. The effective protection and promotion of human rights thus depends greatly on political and policy initiatives; in other words, on the extent to which acts by the legislative or the executive, and the interpretation or review of those acts by the courts, address the values at stake in ways that meet people's legitimate expectations.
In this respect, it should be recalled that the EU legal and political system has not developed effective channels for stakeholders and civil society to have a say in the regulation of technological innovations and, in that way, to convey their views on the benefits and risks involved as well as morally-based considerations. In fact, warnings about the potential repercussions of biometrics on freedom, as well as on human integrity and dignity and its ensuing potential threats for democracy, voiced by expert-based reports and in public debate have been undermined due to the priority given by the EU decision-making authorities to the objectives of European security, and industrial and research policies. A similar assessment may be advanced with respect to the ethical implications of non-reproductive or therapeutic cloning. 
